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I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial activism has a wide variety of definitions, while its true
content remains unclear. This paper will engage in the exercise of
fashioning criteria with which to measure the decisions of the International
Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) for the extent of their judicial activism.
Once these criteria have been determined, I will methodologically analyze
the decisions and come to an objective conclusion about the work of the
ICJ.
This article will show that the ICJ rules in a judicially active fashion.
To this end, it will first introduce the concept of national judicial activism
and adjust it according to the needs of an international tribunal like the
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ICJ. It will discuss the character of the United Nations Charter,
subsuming it to both the treaty and the constitutional model, to show the
different implications of these theoretical distinctions. These distinctions
can alter the objective criteria used to evaluate the ICJ for judicial
activism. Thus, the character of the United Nations Charter plays an
important role iii deciding how to fashion the standard of judicial activism
for our purpose. The analysis will show that neither model alone is
sufficient to describe the United Nations Charter. This article will then
proceed to synthesize both models into a new thesis, resulting in new
criteria for assessing the ICJ. It will then use these adapted norms for
judicial activism to judge the work of the "World Court."
The article will also compare the status of the ICJ to the status of
national courts and the ways of these systems to remedy wrongful
decisions. This comparison will help to better assess the consequences of
judicial activism within the United Nations system and the possible impact
of legitimacy concerns that derive from judicial activism. To assess
whether the ICJ is in fact judicially active, compared to the objective
criteria introduced, this article will divide the practice of the ICJ into
procedural activism and substantive activism.
The assessment of procedural activism in the ICJ requires the critical
refection of domestic procedural concepts, such as the political question
doctrine and the advisory opinion doctrine. This article will introduce the
domestic doctrines of "advisory opinion" and "political question". These
doctrines are creations governed by judicial restraint and the reaction of the
judges to a doctrine of restraint will show whether they are procedurally
judicially active. Considerable adjustment of these concepts for application
in the ICJ is needed, and only after amending the doctrines, this paper will
transfer and apply them to the international plane. Turning to the
substantive United Nations Charter interpretation, this article will primarily
suggest different possible outcomes and reasons for activism discovered in
the ICJ. Lastly, it will consider the legitimacy of the ICJ in light of the
judicial activism displayed, as well as in light of the lack of review of other
United Nations organs' actions. The analysis will conclude with some
remarks referring to the necessary deference that should be afforded to the
ICJ when fulfilling its task and plead for more consistency in the judges'
attitudes toward their task.
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations system,'
and as such, its judges decide many disputes concerning the proper
interpretation of the United Nations Charter text. The ICJ has an
important role to play in international law and politics, because its
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
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decisions are the last word on matters of international law worldwide. Not
all decisions I have read met my approval, and I am certain everyone who
has ever read a few cases, disagrees on which ones meet their approval and
for what reasons. This paper is intended to give a bird's-eye view and
some insight on consistency and activism in fifty years of United Nations
Charter interpretation.
II. WHAT DoEs JUDICIAL ACTIVISM MEAN?
Anglo-American legal systems commonly use the term "judicial
activism," and the early United States Supreme Court became particularly
well known for its judicial activism2 Civil Law jurisdictions do not often
use the term, because Civil Law judges view their roles very differently
from Common Law judges., Even Anglo-American jurisdictions use the
term in a variety of definitions. Due to these differences (and other
problems discussed below) the term shall be laid out anew in the context in
this paper, to develop a better understanding of its meaning in international
tribunals such as the International Court of Justice.
A. What is Judicial Activism?
Judicial activism exists in numerous definitions, originating from
various scholars such as Posner,, Harwood, and Lewis6. These and other
scholars have applied the concept domestically. In order to apply it
internationally, the reader must be informed about the domestic application
first. This will assist the reader in appreciating both the differences
between national and international application and the impact of the
practice of ICJ judges.
2. See generally R.E. FISCHER, THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: ITS NATURE AND
FUNCTION IN UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1977). Some decisions and judges that
have been considered activist are: Judges: Brennan, Blackmun, Burger, Butler, Cardozo, Field,
Marshall. Decisions include Griswold v. Connecticut; New York Times v. Sullivan; Roe v. Wade
and The Slaughter House Cases.
3. - A Civil Law judge will not consider [a] decision he makes to create law, merely to
interpret existing law. Civil Law countries aspire to a complete law, which needs no additional
rules made by judges. Although this may be true only in theory, inner convictions of judges as
civil servants influence their thinking in practice. Thus, the idea of a judge effectively engaged
in lawmaking is unthinkable and with it the idea of judicial activism. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT &
HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (Tony Weir, trans., 2d. ed. 1987).
4. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
5. See generally STERLING HARWOOD, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: A RESTRAINED DEFENSE 2
(1993).
6. See FREDERICK P. LEWIS, THE CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE ENDURANCE
OF THE WARREN COURT LEGACY IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE (1999).
Pair
184 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:181
Judicial activism in the United States or any national jurisdiction is
separate and distinct from any meaning the term could have internationally.
Judicial activism can be identified by measuring either the behavior of
judges against objective criteria, or the results achieved against other
possible results. Most definitions use behaviors as a focal point.7
However, no single definition has achieved universal acceptance and
therefore, interpretations of what constitutes judicial activism vary. The
most useful interpretations for our purposes employ objective criteria to
identify the concept of judicial activism. Judges decide in a judicially
active fashion if they (a) refuse to take an attitude of deference for
legislative or executive power or judgment, (b) relax requirements of
justiciability, (c) break precedent or (d) loosely construe constitutions,
statutes or binding precedent.8 Some of the criticisms9 of judicial activism
include non-democratic lawmaking, decision-making based on personal
morals or preferences, and rewriting law under the guise of
interpretation'0 . Black also adds progressiveness to the definition." The
above-mentioned criteria establish a working definition to be used
throughout this paper that will suffice for our purposes.' 2
Judicial activism can be identified not only by behavioral patterns but
also by the results it can produce. The most common feature of a
judicially active outcome is avoidance of an unjust result. For example,
through creative reasoning, a judge can avoid letting strict application of
the law lead to an unjust result." Results so achieved are mostly tailored to
the case at hand rather than to the overarching system which is usually
taken into account by legislators.
7. Compare supra notes 4, 5 and 6.
8. HARWOOD, supra note 5, at 2.
9. I consider criticism nothing but a negative definition of the concept in this context.
10. HARWOOD, supra note 5, at 3.
11. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK Er AL., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 847 (7th ed. 1990).
12. This working definition will suffice for the moment, because the domestic definition of
judicial activism is but a starting point for this analysis.
13. HARWOOD, supra note 5, at 3.
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B. Domestic Implications of Judicial Activism14
The parties involved in the proceeding are primarily impacted by
implications of judicial activism,"5 and even beyond the parties concerned
in a particular dispute, the overall structure of the legal system is affected
by judicially active decisions. ," Therefore, judicial activism can lead to
questions relating to legitimacy."1 When judges act in an activist fashion,
two common paths can be taken to avoid the result achieved. The first
possibility to affect an unwanted result is judicial.. The second is
legislative. The likelihood of access to these ways differs depending on the
court involved.
The judicial possibility is through the appeals process. In lower
courts, appeals to the next higher courts are possible, and will likely lead
to a different result, should the judge have been too active in construing the
law. In higher-level courts, such as Appellate Courts or even State
Supreme Courts the possibility for appeal is much reduced, because higher
courts have discretion to grant or deny certiorari."$ For example, the grant
of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court is not guaranteed and thus the
possibility of appeal may end at this point. 9 Appeals from the United
States Supreme Courts are naturally excluded once a judgment is
rendered.2' In general, judicial activism in the highest court of any given
14. It is impossible to address judicial activism in every country, so I choose the U.S. as
an example the reader will be most familiar with. In the U.S. domestic context, judicial activism
is a very disputed subject and therefore I must stress that concerning domestic judicial activism, I
am entirely neutral and do not intend to pass judgments or conclusions. Like Cannon, "I accept
judicial activism [in the domestic arena] as a fact of life." Bradley C. Cannon, Defending the
dimensions ofjudicial activism, 66 JUDICATURE, 236, 246 (1983).
15. The individual party is affected, because they believed the state of the law to be one
thing, when the judge decides it is another.
16. Different judges can make different decisions, therefore, the system is affected through
lack of clarity and inconsistency of the law.
17. In the domestic context, the question of legitimacy does not seem as pressing to me
because judges are elected publicly, or appointed by an elected member of the executive.
Further, statutes and the Constitution offer a far better anchorage in domestic law then they offer
in international law. The issue of legitimacy in the ICJ is discussed in another paragraph
separately.
18. By way of example, the House of Lords can decide either to take a case, or refuse to
take it. ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM IN ACTION: THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 219, 221 (3d ed. 1999).
19. See generally WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM
OF THE UNITED STATES (1995).
20. This is true provided there is no separate constitutional Court in the country as exists
in Italy, Germany, and South Africa.
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jurisdiction cannot be "corrected" through appeal.22
The legislative way to correct decisions of overly active judges is to
lobby lawmakers to overturn precedent or interpretation by way of a new
statute. Even the highest courts of any given jurisdiction are susceptible to
legislative action.Y If a legislature does not like a decision of a Supreme
Court, then it will pass a statute or regulation changing the effects of the
decision.Y Legislative override is possible in both state and federal
legislatures.2' The legislative path is not open at all stages; because it is
quite unlikely that Congress would act on an interpretation of a lower
court, whether the judgment is subject to appeal or not." An example of
Legislature in the United States overriding the Supreme Court is Missouri
v. Holland.6 In some cases, even ordinary congressional action cannot
override the Supreme Court, whether activist or not.27  An American
example is Marbury v. Madison,29 in which the Supreme Court declared to
have exclusive right to interpret the Constitution and derived this right
from the Constitution. No legislative act short of an amendment of the
Constitution could overturn this decision.
Chances of action, either through appeal or legislative act, decrease
with the proficiency of the judges' using "interpretive techniques."2 9
Neither of the two mechanisms is thus fully failsafe. The implication of
judicial activism is therefore far from minimal for both the interplay of
laws in any country and the dispute of the parties involved.
21. In the United States Supreme Court, many such decisions have been rendered from
Marbury v. Madision, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), to Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382
(1920).
22. Ironically, the highest courts seem to be the most likely target for this kind of
ramification.
23. An example of legislative override is the Miranda warnings. The U.S. Supreme Court
stated they were not constitutionally mandated, so Congress enacted the protection of Miranda
warnings through statute. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
24. Although legislative override is specifically tailored to the U.S., the general idea is
true in every democratic society.
25. It would be ineffective for the legislature to act on every magistrate court's unpopular
judgment. They will most likely say there is a possibility for appeal.
26. The History of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 40 S.Ct. 382 (1920), was as
follows: Congress passed a statute concerning migratory birds. The Supreme Court ruled the
statute unconstitutional. The legislature then turned around, made a treaty with Canada, and
reenacted the statute as treaty. The Supreme Court then approved the piece of legislation.
27. I am referring to regular legislative action, short of amending of the Constitution.
28. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
29. This is so because the better the judge conceals the actual reason for the result, or the
better he or she can employ unrelated precedent, the less likely the judge will be discovered and
overturned.
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Having the potential to change the law through interpreting it in any
given case reflects much power, the abuse of which leads to the issue of
legitimacy of judicial activism, particularly where a decision is non-
reviewable. In a way the judge can make law, but should judges make
law? In the tripod structure of democratic society, the role of the judiciary
involves interpretation and not creation of law. In the United States, state
court judges are elected, so that their beliefs and morals will likely reflect
the belief and morals of the community whose disputes are affected by
potential activism." When non-elected federal justices can make law,
judicial activism seems to be contrary to the foundation of democratic
society.' We will get back to the point of legitimacy later in the discussion
and will not focus on it in the context of domestic law. Just one word
spoken true and wise to this subject: sometimes we do not want the
majority to be able to control it all!n
C. Judicial Activism Internationally
After having laid a foundation for the following discussion, the
transition of the concept of judicial activism to the international plane must
be made. This shift exceeds mere copying of concepts, because it involves
establishing a new working definition of judicial activism adapted to the
international context. Both working conditions and impact of decisions
vary internationally from their domestic equivalents. The transfer made in
this article is only applicable to the International Court of Justice, which is
the focus of this work. This discussion is also limited in substantive
considerations to the United Nations Charter interpretation.
To make a successful conversion from the domestic to the
international sphere, the United Nations Charter must be considered more
closely with respect to its function and purpose, because theoretical
classification impacts the criteria forming our new working definition.
Some have considered the United Nations Charter to be an instrument
similar to a constitution3 while others see the United Nations Charter as
30. Judges are elected not only because of competence, but also because of personality. If
the judge does not reflect the community's beliefs by ruling in a certain fashion, then he/she will
not be reelected.
31. See LEWIS, supra note 6, at ch. 3, for a good discussion. In most countries, judges
are not elected, so that their law making can be compared to the U.S. federal judges. The same
is true for judges of international tribunals.
32. I refrain from further comments on the subject in the realm of domestic courts,
because it exceeds the scope of this paper and is only included to clarify the later points
concerning the ICJ.
33. See Oscar Schachter, The Law of the United Nations, 60 YALE L. J. 189, 193 (1951)
(book review).
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simply a treaty.-' Even the ICJ displays some lack of uniformity on this
question in its decisions.'-
1. The Constitutional and Treaty Model
In this subsection, I will discuss the arguments for and against the
schools of thought that consider the United Nations Charter either
constitution or treaty respectively.
The constitutional model seems appealing, but has its shortcomings.
Similar to many domestic constitutions, the United Nations Charter forms
the basic underpinning for the organization of the United Nations. It
purports to give a purpose 6, allocate powers" and create different organs.,8
National constitutions usually establish branches of government,
comparable to the principal organs of the United Nations, allocate powers
to the organs/branches, establish a judiciary, and grant certain rights and
freedoms. Many international organizations follow a comparable model
with more or less similarity.3' The analogy of corporate charters would be
more appropriate because they too have an executive body and
shareholders as constituents of their power.4' The shareholders could also
be equated with the members of the General Assembly. It is useful to
consider these structural similarities more closely.
34. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 157 (July 1962) [hereinafter
Certain Expenses].
35. The Charter has been called a treaty in the Certain Expenses, Id., and a constitution in
the Conditions of Admission of a state to membership in the United Nations, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 70
(May 28) [hereinafter Conditions of Admission]; to mention only two different cases. Many
authors refer to constitutionalism with respect to the UN and the ICJ. See generally EDWARD
MCWHINNEY & PAUL MARTIN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE WESTERN
TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987).
36. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
37. Each organ has a set of powers allocated in the Charter. The Security Council, e.g.,
has powers allocated in UN Charter arts. 24-26; the Economic and Social Council in U.N.
Charter arts. 62-66, and so on.
38. The principal organs are enumerated in U.N. CHARTER art. 7 para. 1.
39. See e.g., Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on the European Union, the
Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
40. See generally WILLIAM KLEIN & JOHN COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE, 118 (6th ed. 1996).
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a. Structure of the Organization
The United Nations Charter creates four main bodies," which have
their own allocated powers: the Security Council4, the General Assembly, 3
the Secretariat," and the ICJ4, which, if compared to national democratic
models, reveals some striking similarities to domestic constitutions. The
General Assembly is a body comprising all members talking about the
world and the state of affairs, very similar to legislatures. The point where
the analogy to legislatures fails is that the General Assembly does not
create hard law in the form of statutes; it has no legislative power in the
domestic sense." It does, however, have the power to make statutes and
rules for the bodies within its control." The Security Council could be said
to be the executive branch of the United Nations, since substantive power
comes from the Council in the form of binding resolutions.'4 The
Secretary General could be viewed as the head of state, representing the
organization and capable of ceremonial acts. 9 Unlike the American head
of state, the President, the Secretary General is without true power.1 The
ICJ could be viewed as the judiciary branch, the final arbiter of
legitimacy.'
b. Character of the United Nations Charter
The character of the United Nations Charter may point toward a
constitutional model as well. It directs powers and functions, declares a
purpose, and has every possibility to provide authority for a wide variety
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, para. 1, establishes the main organs. Although it also creates
the Trusteeship Council and the Economic and Social Council, they have little impact on this
analysis.
42. Id. at ch. V is devoted to the Security Council, describing powers and duties.
43. Id. at ch. IV, describing General Assembly powers and duties.
44. Id. at ch. XV, describing Secretariat powers and duties.
45. Id. at ch. XIV, describing ICJ powers and duties.
46. This statement should be read as excluding housekeeping functions, such as the budget
power.
47. The Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J.47 (July 13) [hereinafter Effects of Awards].
48. The Security Council has the power to compel members. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
49. U.N. CHARTER art. 97 makes the Secretary General the head of the Secretariat.
50. The concept of a virtually powerless Head of State is not unknown. In the Federal
Republic of Germany, the president has limited power. GRUNDGESETZ [GG [Constitution] arts.
54-61 (F.R.G.). Similarly, the Queen of England, is still head of state. Like the Secretary
General, the power of these persons in office are symbolic in nature.
51. Matthias J. Herdegen, The Constinajonalization of the UN Security System, 27 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 137 (1994).
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of "laws," due to certain ambiguities. These resemblances to domestic
constitutions are bound to be present in many treaties that purport to form
organizations, and they are essential to some international contracts. 3 The
ICJ has declared that the United Nations is a special kind of organization
and that its character is different form any other organization due to its
purpose and fundamentality,5 ' so that this uniqueness should elevate the
United Nations Charter to the constitutional level.
The ambiguity of the United Nations Charter in certain areas could
also be comparable to domestic constitutions, because constitutions are
meant to survive changes in society.5  Against this point stands the
argument that the world leaders would have never agreed to make a
constitution, and that ambiguities result from a lack of consensus rather
than foresight.5 6 It could be argued that they made a treaty to establish an
organization of fundamental reach, but not a world constitution.
The limitless duration of the United Nations Charter gives it the
character distinct from treaties.57 However, this seems rather a tribute to
the effort behind succeeding to form an organization so many countries
could agree on. 8 The United Nations Charter is important, like a
constitution is, but that is why it cannot be interpreted as a constitution. Its
failing would be catastrophic. When would we be able to write a new
constitution and get over 150 countries to agree to it?59 Although I find the
idea intriguing in order to stress the value and gravity of the United
Nations Charter by calling it a constitution, it cannot be a true constitution.
c. Pro-Treaty Arguments
Scholars have recognized the difficulty of the constitutional model and
52. An example of the ambiguity that creates problems is exhibited in the UNAT case in
1954; See Effects of Awards, supra note 47.
53. See Blaine Sloan, The United Nations Charter as a Constitution, 1 PACE Y.B. INT'L L.
61, 116 (1989).
54. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
55. The U.S. Constitution, now over 200 years old, is a good example of a constitution
surviving over a long period of time.
56. Cf. Blaine Sloan, supra note 53, at 117, 118 (citing Lord Halifax, Verbatim Minutes
of the First Meeting of the Commission I, Doc. 10006, 1/6, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 26 (1945)).
57. Compare Conference on the Conservation of the Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
19 I.L.M. 837 (1980).
58. It is hard to imagine fifty countries agreeing on such a fundamental document now. It
could be worse if this process had to be repeated time after time, whenever the "contract" came
to an end.
59. The number of current members as of Apr. 17, 2001, is 189. See
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.htmi (last visited Oct. 9, 2001).
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have thus focused on the treaty model. The main points in favor of this
view derive from the shortcomings of the constitutional model and from
the mere fact that the United Nations Charter fits the definition of a treaty.
A treaty is an instrument between subjects of international law, mostly
states, purporting to deal with the objects of international law.60 The
United Nations Charter is concluded between the oldest subjects of
international law and deals with objects of international law, namely
international peace and security. There is no judicial review as in domestic
constitutions;61 there are no democratic justifications, no world elections
for representation in the United Nations; there is no lawmaking in the
domestic sense. Countries came together, bargained and formed a contract
for the formation of an organization to achieve one purpose: international
peace and security.62 There was no delegation of power from the people
or, for that matter, from countries to give to a new government.6 3
However, contracts are not usually open-ended and do not have the power
to bind third parties." The United Nations, through its United Nations
Charter, has in effect the power to bind and put pressure on third parties.61
d. Implications of the Models
The impacts both theories will have on the standards to be imposed
are broad indeed. If the United Nations Charter is a mere contract, a
treaty, it ought to be interpreted according to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties." The Vienna Convention requires a more textualist
approach and refers to the use of intent and purpose for interpretation only
if the text leads to an absurd result. Under the treaty-based approach, no
consideration would need to be given to gaps, functioning, and vitality of
the United Nations system. No double-checking of purpose and intent as
against other organs would be appropriate. If the United Nations Charter
60 1965 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2 para. la, reprinted in PAUL
REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATIES (Jose Mico & Peter Haggenmacher trans.
1989).
61. For a scholar arguing that there is no judicial review, see Herdegen, supra note 51.
62. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2.
63. Constitutions are usually associated with the creation of a government.
64. This excludes third party beneficiaries.
65. Reparations for Injures Received suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949
I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11) [hereinafter Reparations]. (Israel had not been a member of the UN at the
time, yet was bound through this opinion. In addition, sanctions can also put pressure on non-
member states).
66. Although the Vienna Convention does not technically apply because it is younger than
the UN Charter, the principles of interpretation are still valid.
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is to be interpreted like a constitution, then a more functionalist approach
is necessary.
A constitution has to function, because it builds the foundation of the
rule of law, unlike a mere treaty. Intent or purpose might be the only
bases of interpretation. If a mere contract is silent on a point, legal norms
already in existence will be applied to the contract. In the constitutional
context, that is not possible. If the United Nations Charter were a
constitution, it would mean that similar standards apply as in the
interpretation of domestic constitutions and similar standards as in
constitutional law would be appropriate. It would also mean that the
interpretations given by the ICJ must adhere to a higher standard, results
reached would always have to be weighed against the spirit of the United
Nations Charter, short of hyper-textualism and political decisions. The ICJ
would have to be able to review the actions of the other organs of the
United Nations to their conformity with the United Nations Charter and
imply that the ICJ could annul the acts of other organs as ultra vires. In
short, the constitutional model would require both more freedom for the
judges to aid the organization in functioning and more deference to other
organs with respect to the same goal. The treaty model would require
more restraint of interpretive freedom and less deference to the other
organs, because the ICJ would be limited by the pure text.
e. New Model: Consensual Constitution
The United Nations Charter is no constitution; however, the treaty
model has its shortcomings as well. It is certainly a mixture between the
two models.7 The United Nations Charter is a "consensus constitution."
A consensus constitution is a contract forming the basis of an organization,
one that exceeds the original consensus but remains limited by its original
form. This model gives greater leeway for interpretation, without allowing
the filling of blatant gaps in the law. The United Nations Charter does not
stand alone and customary international law as well as jus cogens norms
can be utilized when gaps are apparent to help bridge them. This implies,
that the objective criteria one has to use for evaluating the decision of the
ICJ for activism have to be sensitive to both textual and teleological
possibilities. The "consensual constitution" model affords deference to the
other organs of the United Nations and interpretive freedom to the ICJ to
make the organization work, while it restrains deference and interpretive
freedom at the same time, through the knowledge that the text and overall
67. See Sloan, supra note 53.
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scheme are paramount and may not be compromised for the sake of
convenience or function."
2. Legal Systems
The "consensus constitution" model alone is not adequate to provide a
standard for ICJ judge. Knowing what kind of instrument is to be
interpreted, the status of the court within the system needs to be discussed
to find the appropriate level of scrutiny. Besides the institutional
differences between national and international system, there are variances
in the specific legal structure between courts that influence the transition of
the judicial activism doctrine.69
In the United Nations' court system, a structure comparable to that of
the domestic plane is lacking. In domestic courts, various steps of appeal
are possible, whereas the in United Nations system the ICJ is sole
tribunal.70 Although there are other international tribunals, such as the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the World Trade Organization boards,
these tribunals are unconnected with each other and do not form a coherent
system comparable to domestic judiciaries.71 Tribunals that are more
closely connected to the United Nations structure, such as the UNAT, n the
ICTY,73 or the ITR,74 however, do not fall under one coherent structure. 7
68. See MCWHINNEY, supra note 35, at 143, 144. He accepts the law-making role of the
ICJ more readily, and considers the ICJ even less drastic than the U.S. Supreme Court. He
states that the ICJ only does as is necessary for the maintenance of the organization.
69. This will be explained in this section more closely.
70. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Charter does not provide for the creation of
additional courts. U.S. CONST. art. 3; U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
71. Unlike a domestic judiciary, there are different statutes making these courts, and all
follow different rules of procedure.
72. See Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the United Nations, as adopted by the
General Assembly by resolution 351 A (IV) on 24 November 1949, reprinted in BYUONG CHUL
KOH, UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL (1966).
73. U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3217 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
74. U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3453 mtg.,U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
75. The ICJ served for a brief period as appellate body to the UNAT in special
circumstances, but got tired of the task. Under consensus circumstances, the ICJ serves as
appellate board for ICA decisions if countries agree. These circumstances are, however,
extraordinary and not relevant for this discussion. Although they are connected to the UN, they
have independent jurisdiction and their decisions are not subject to appeal in the ICJ. The
exception is the UNAT, where appeal is possible. One could argue that state courts are separate
from the federal system as well, and that the lower federal courts had not been established
expressly by the Constitution either. These arguments must fail. The UNAT is established by
the General Assembly and has it's own statute and not the same subject matter or personal
jurisdiction that the ICJ has. The ICTY and ITR were established by the Security Council and
have their own statutes and jurisdiction different from the ICJ.
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Thus, the ICJ is the sole judicial organ deciding matters arising between
states or the organs of the United Nations in the United Nations system.
No appeal, i.e., no judicial correction, is possible. This fact gives the ICJ
the status of a Supreme Court or a Constitutional Court for the purpose of
measuring the impact of activism.
The impact of the unique role as interpreter of the United Nations
Charter in case of conflict is intensified because the possibility of
legislative action to remedy a wrongful decision is virtually lacking the
context of United Nations Charter interpretation. The only possibility of
overriding an interpretation is United Nations Charter amendment.6 The
United Nations cannot overrule an interpretation of the ICJ by mere
statute. First, there is no power to make a statue." Second, as the basic
instrument of the organization, the United Nations Charter has somewhat
the status of a constitution as discussed supra. A United Nations Charter
amendment has occurred only thrice since its entry into force, and it is
very unlikely to occur again. This gives the ICJ much more influence than
even the Supreme Courts or Constitutional courts of nations possess. 8 In
turn, this power consequently requires both more regard to the overall
scheme of the United Nations when making decisions in order to let it
serve its function, and more judicial restraint than a domestic court would
have to exercise to avoid being too judicially active. A wrong decision
cannot be remedied as easily, if at all. The following section will identify
the criteria applied to the ICJ for judicial activism with regard to the
differences in the systems.
3. Objective Criteria for ICJ
Oriented on the prior domestic working definition of judicial activism,
this section identifies a new working definition for the concept to evaluate
the ICJ.
Some of the domestic criteria for judicial activism do not neatly fit in
the international setting. Non-democratic lawmaking is one of the
76. There have been only 3 sets of amendments, not adding any paragraphs, merely
changing the Charter; the latest came into force in June 1968. They are quite similar to the U.S.
constitutional amendments but even more difficult in practice. In practice, the ICJ cannot compel
action in accordance with its decisions. It would have to rely on the Security Council and thus an
interpretation might be ignored, specifically as requested in advisory opinions. See Herdegen,
supra note 51.
77. There is no provision in the UN Charter that gives power to legislate. Compare U.N.
CHARTER.
78. This is true at least in theory, but in practice, the ICJ is not always obeyed. See
Certain Expenses, supra note 34. France and Russia still refused to pay their dues.
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examples: there is no democratic process involved in international law.79
One could substitute "non-democratic" for "progressive." If there is no
law on the subject or sufficiently close to it, such as custom or treaty, the
ICJ cannot give an opinion without progressing international law. This
progress would create law without direct participation of the subjects of
international law and could be compared with non-democratic lawmaking
domestically, matching one of Black's points of reference.
Breaking of precedent is an aspect I will fully strike as an objective
criterion, because precedent is an Anglo-American concept. In
international law, there is no formal precedent, although in practice, prior
decisions can be of importance and are often quoted by the ICJ judges.'
This criterion should be abandoned for another reason: there are simply
not enough cases in comparison to domestic law to create a gapless net of
precedent. In addition, because the ICJ is the only court, it can only break
its own precedent,82 an act which domestically is not considered overly
activist.
The criterion of relaxation of justiciability requirements ought to be
modified, but it remains in substance, because the ICJ does not have
extensive justiciability criteria. Issues like political questions, 3 mootness,
and ripeness have different implications." The ICJ has not frequently
applied the mootness doctrine, 85 and ripeness issues can easily be avoided
by phrasing a question for advisory opinion or request for (preliminary)
measures. The concept of justiciability is better-served in the international
arena under the heading of deference to political decisions.
Lack of deference to decisions of other United Nations organs is a
definite criterion for activism. How much deference is required and how
little mandated by the structure of the United Nations Charter as
"consensual constitution" is another question. The rough concept is that
79. See generally ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW COURSEBOOK, TO
ACCOMPANY INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY, ch. 8 (1994).
80. See BLACK ET AL, supra note 11.
81. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the UN, supra note 34, at 156, (citing with approval
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations Article 4 of the
Charter, 1947 I.C.J. 61). For more information on precedent in the ICJ, see generally
MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT (1996).
82. One more precedent-possibility exists: the prior Permanent Court of International
Justice. But for the purpose of this statement, the courts ought to be considered one for successor
reasons. Id.
83. This will be discussed inf!ra.
84. I will not go into detail concerning the differences and ask the reader to bear with me
in accepting that there are differences.
85. The only case I can think of was Nuclear Test (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 457 (1974).
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the court needs to afford deference to other organs of the United Nations,
unless there is an apparent United Nations Charter violation or a violation
of object and purpose of the United Nations Charter. Deference need only
be afforded in areas where the particular organ has absolute jurisdiction to
decide; in particular I am referring to examples like the Article 39
determinations of the Security Council" or the budget approval power of
the General Assembly.' Review of actions taken should be limited to the
criteria laid out in the United Nations Charter for the specific action and
the general purpose of the United Nations Charter. Deference should be
broad enough to exclude only what specifically violates either the text or
the intent and purpose of the United Nations Charter as they are stated in
Articles One and Two. Where concurrent jurisdiction is given to two or
more United Nations organs, the ICJ should be mindful of who is posing a
request and whether that party would be injured in case of infringement of
powers."
Loose construction of the United Nations Charter remains as a
criterion. We now add another aspect, tailored to the ICJ: loose
construction of questions put before the court in advisory opinions as well
as rephrasing the questions beyond the necessary to retain jurisdiction.
This criterion is very important indeed, because it can give the court a
power to address issues almost sua sponte. This power has not been
conferred on the court by any treaty, and no other court has such power
either domestically" or internationally.90 In addition, its use might create a
discrepancy between practice and decision."
86. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
87. U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 1.
88. In addition, I think it would not be a bad idea to steal some of the concepts of domestic
variable scrutiny for a variety of different scenarios, depending on how important the action
taken by another organ are.
89. This is to be read to exclude issues of justiciability, which can and in some instances
have to be raised by the court. I am here referring to substantive issues. I am not referring to
dictum either, because it does not have the same effect nationally form internationally.
90. With the exception of the International Criminal Court [hereinafter ICC], which has an
almost sua sponte aspect. The prosecutor of the ICC can initiate proceedings. Since he is a part
of the ICC, one could say there is some sua sponte possibility.
91. As an example, I am speaking about the voting procedure in the Security Council:
Although the court approved of the practice despite the words of the Charter, Legal
Consequences of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security
Council Resolution 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia]; had the court raised this
question and answered it negatively when the other organs did not believe it to be a problem,
there could have been a world of trouble. Compare Marcella David, Passport to Justice,
Internationalization of the Political Question Doctrine for Application in the World Court, 40
HARV. INT'L L.J. 81, 121 (1999).
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Decision-making based on personal morals or preferences and
rewriting law under the guise of interpretation is the ultimate criterion for
judicial activism. This includes focusing on results in avoidance of an
unjust result-for example, through creative reasoning rather than strict
application of the law. Also included is narrowing the question to exclude
aspects that the requesting organ anticipated to be answered. This factor
must hence be altered for the international setting. Advisory opinions, for
example, require the court to make a statement for the overall structure of
the United Nations, so that creative reasoning becomes necessary in the
face of a lack of narrow grounds. In the case of contentious proceedings,
the matter changes, because narrow grounds are available for limiting the
decision and should be utilized. This leads to a two-fold approach.
Stricter scrutiny for review is required for contentious proceedings than for
advisory opinions. For the ICJ, this ties into the remarks about deference.
Personal preference not to review certain actions of the Security Council
not only qualifies as judicial activism, but also raises a question of
legitimacy, because personal preferences change with the set of judges on
the court.
In summary, the new working definition includes: a) progressing of
international law as defined above; b) lack of deference; c) loose or overly
narrow construction of queries; and d) decision-making based on personal
preferences with focus on a result rather than in light of the United Nations
Charter as consensual constitution.
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER IN THE
ICJ
The above-mentioned forms of judicial activism are used in this
section to evaluate the ICJ decisions. It will be proposed that ICJ
jurisprudence in reference to activism cannot be subdivided into phases;9
however, I will subdivide the analysis in two categories: procedural issues
and substantive United Nations Charter interpretation.
A. Procedure Evidencing Activism
In every legal system, courts exercise some form of restraint when
asserting their power to adjudicate,9 and the ICJ is not an exception.
Doctrines like ripeness or mootness have been applied in the ICJ as in
92. Cf. THOMAS J. BODIE, POLITICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF AN ACTIVIST
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 70 (1995), available at
http://www.unt.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/bodie.htm.
93. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES (1991).
Pair
198 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:181
many courts across the globe.9 This section will discuss the Political
Question doctrine more closely."
The ICJ does not recognize the Political Question doctrine in the
domestic sense, because use of the Political Question rhetoric is
incompatible with the mission of the ICJ. 9'6 Although the court can only
consider legal questions before it,17 in the international arena hardly any
question does not involve political decision-making.98 In the domestic area,
the Political Question doctrine describes behavior of self-restraint exercised
by the courts when decisions of political branches are involved and when
these branches are expressly granted absolute discretion over the area the
decision affects." This doctrine of self-restraint could be adapted to the
United Nations system.'°° The ICJ could review other organs' actions for
the apparent compliance with the United Nations Charter when requested,
yet refrain from criticizing once there is no apparent violation; or, in the
alternative, when the organ that is subject to the inquiry had absolute
discretion in the matter.10' The ICJ would lose importance and most likely
many cases if the Political Question doctrine were fully applied, because
international law is made by political decisions and the court made clear
that those could be used to evaluate new political decisions made prior in
time. Although the ICJ never rejected the doctrine as such,n much impact
has been taken from it, and the court has reduced the substance of the
Political Question doctrine to insignificance.103 Hence it is fair to say the
ICJ has rejected the doctrine.'"
94. The mootness question was asserted in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457
(Dec. 20). There a unilateral declaration of France not to conduct more tests was considered
sufficient to render the dispute moot
95. The division is the same as the above-mentioned behavior and result separation. The
procedural analysis equals the behavior part of the definition; the substantive analysis, the result
part.
96. See David, supra note 91, at 145.
97. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 65 [hereinafter ICJ statute].
98. This issue is explained further in the text.
99. This approach to the Political Question doctrine is taken from U.S. Constitutional law,
Baker v. Carr, 389 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
100. See David, supra note 91, at 132.
101. The Security Council is the only organ deciding whether a threat to the peace exists.
This decision would not be reviewable; actions taken under the powers of Chapter VII however
would be reveiwable, to see if they violate the charter or the object and purpose of it (e.g., SC
ordering genocide). Cf. id. at 133 (believing considerable adaptation is needed).
102. See Conditions of Admission, supra note 35, at para 24 saying it is a political
question.
103. Already in Conditions of Admission, the court stated:
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Rejecting the Political Question doctrine is not judicially active in
the ICJ, although it would be in any other domestic court. Measured
against our definition of judicial activism, the rejection of the doctrine
makes sense. As stated above, every decision that ICJ can make °, would
only hold new political decisions against other commitments entered into
through prior political decisions.'06 These commitments take the form of
legal rules despite their political character. Pacta servanda sunt has
always been a recognized principle. In order to answer questions of
political nature, the ICJ has often interpreted the questions given to it, to
transform them into issues that can be legally analyzed.1'w In doing so, the
ICJ exercises discretion and judgment. Unlike domestic legal instruments,
such as the United States Constitution, the United Nations Charter is more
concerned with function of its organs than with substance,1w so that an
allocation of powers that grants discretion exclusively to one organ hardly
exists. ,o9
The Certain Expenses case makes clear that the responsibility for
international peace and security is not only in the Security Council's hands
alone but also in the General Assembly's hands. 110 This example makes
When a question is referred to the Court, the latter therefore must decide whether its
dominant element is legal, and whether it should accordingly deal with it, or whether
the political element is dominant and, in that case, it must declare that it has no
jurisdiction. In the questions, which it is called upon, to consider, the Court must,
however, take into account all aspects of the matter, including the political aspect when
it is closely bound up with the legal aspect. It would be a manifest mistake to seek to
limit the Court to consideration of questions solely from their legal aspect, to the
exclusion of other aspects; it would be inconsistent with the realities of international
life. It follows from the foregoing that the constitutional Charter cannot be interpreted
according to a strictly legal criterion; another and broader criterion must be employed
and room left, if need be, for political considerations.
Conditions of Admission, supra note 35, at 70.
104. Id.
105. Assuming they do not overstep their boundaries.
106. Since international law is made by states that decide as political entities every decision
and every act has political implications, regardless of discretion. Every country has full
authority -over their affairs, so that with a full political question doctrine no legal review would
be possible.
107. See e.g. Case concerning the military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (Nov. 1984).
[hereinafter Nicaragua].
108. The articles entitled functions and powers only number 17 of 111 articles. Compare
U.N. CHARTER.
109. There are instances, but in general, the main functions are allocated between two
organs, e.g. Maintenance of international peace and security. See MCWHINNEY & MARTIN,
supra note 35, at 143 (agreeing that the organs have little exclusive power).
110. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
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clear that little true separation of powers exists. Without a clear separation
of power, a basic underpinning of the Political Question doctrine is missing
in many cases before the court. No one organ can claim absolute
discretion necessary in one sector to claim a right to be free from
scrutiny.'" The Court cannot refuse to decide a case because one organ is
vested with absolute discretion, so that review would be outside justiciable
limits. Also, in terms of advisory opinions discussed below, the Court
cannot, without compelling reasons, refuse to answer a question.112 A
certain level of flexibility is required for the ICJ because, unlike the United
States government, the Security Council may not intervene in any
contentious proceedings."3  The following paragraph will determine
whether the ICJ was judicially active when accepting political questions.
1. Transforming Inquiries Into Legal Issues
According to the ICJ statute, the Court can only answer questions of a
legal nature."4  One example of the court transforming an inquiry is the
first on the Court's docket: the Conditions of Admission case in 1948."11
In that case, the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion
concerning additional criteria to the admission of new members process of
the United Nations Charter. The question was political in nature: Can
sovereign states be bound to consent to admission without the bargaining
process usually involved in state action?", Holding the question justiciable,
the judges stated that there was more than political will involved in affairs
of the United Nations Charter and that states would be bound to the rules
they had agreed to without much leeway.
The ICJ initially made clear that it did not intend to pass judgment on
the internal decisions that prompted a vote for or against membership. '17
111. There are some rare exceptions, like the presence of the article 39 situations by the
Security Council, but a review of the actions taken under article 39 situations are still possible
against purpose and intent of the Charter.
112. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 IC.J. 226, para. 14 (July
8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons].
113. Compare David, supra note 91.
114. ICJ Statute art. 65.
115. See Conditions of Admission, supra note 35.
116. What I am trying to get at is that states usually do not do favors for another state
without gaining an advantage, or worsening their collective position. The states could not accept
that the Charter would be able to take precedence over the political will of the states that created
it.
117. See Conditions of Admission, supra note 35, at 60. That issue would have been
political to decide.
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While the substance of the interpretation stated the obvious,", the second
interpretation cut precisely into the heart of the inquiry. Considering the
circumstances, the General Assembly wanted to know what, if any, kind of
condition can the members require for an affirmative vote while still
fulfilling their obligations under the United Nations Charter."9 The Court
cleverly limited the question by expressing the opinion: "The Court is not
called upon either to define the meaning and scope of the conditions on
which admission is made dependent, or to specify the elements which may
serve in a concrete case to verify the existence of the requisite
conditions."'11
While the General Assembly wanted to know what kind of conditions
can be imposed other than those purely internal to the state decision
making process, the ICJ only wanted to answer that internal processes
were of no importance. In doing so, the Court refused to declare openly
that it was unwilling to pass judgment on internal decision-making
processes, but declared rather that the question was not asked.' 2 ' This
limitation served only one function, namely to disguise that the Court was
not willing to answer the second part of the question. The Court reduced
the question of the General Assembly from one of entitlement to add
conditions into a question of the mere interpretation text of Article Four of
the United Nations Charter."I This interpretation transformed the question
into a purely legal analysis of a textual provision rather than into a problem
of interplay of politics.
Measuring this decision on the working definition of judicial activism,
the judges neither acted progressively nor lacked deference. Nevertheless,
they construed the question posed loosely. In doing so, the judges did not
act in a judicially active fashion, because the construction was not overly
loose. The judges remained neutral. Holding parties to what they have
118. It is impossible for the organization to control the reasons why a member passes its
vote. If it did, it would infringe on the principle of sovereignty. Each country can do with its
vote whatever it chooses. And is precisely not subject to legal standards.
119. The question was phrased as follows:
In particular, can such a Member, while it recognizes the conditions set forth in that
provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject its affirmative vote to the
additional condition that other States be admitted to membership in the United Nations
together with that State?
Conditions of Admission, supra note 35, at 58.
120. Id.
121. In fact it was not asked, but the way the court limited the scope of its decision at the
outset makes it seem like they thought it was. If it had been asked, the limitation would not have
been necessary, but rather a declaration that these matters are not legal.
122. U.N. CHARTER art. 4.
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promised to do is a universal principle, the application of which did not
overstep any boundaries or advance the general understanding; therefore
progressiveness cannot be implied here. A lack of deference is not
evidenced, because there was no body to afford deference to. The General
Assembly was requesting advice because it was split over the question, and
individual members' actions do not require the Court to extend the
privilege of deference.'1 No act requiring deference occurred, regardless
of the loose construction. The Court did not overstep its bounds.
The Nicaragua case in 19841u was politically very charged and
provided for another opportunity to test for the Political Question doctrine:
Is a country answerable before a court if it engages in military activity that
it considers vital to its interest? Each political leader is bound to act as is
best for his/her country in order to maintain approval in that country.n Is
survival of the state as entity in international law not the ultimate issue of
sovereignty, a sovereignty that the United Nations had accepted?'2 The
ICJ held: No.'1 The Court rephrased this highly emotional question into a
question of fact that was to be held against the word of the United Nations
Charter.1'2 States could not engage in aggressive behavior unless in self-
defense, a question of fact before a clear rule.'2 9 The obligation not to act
in violation of another State's sovereignty and its exceptions was an
obligation that the United States entered into and could be held to abide
by. 130
This opinion was not judicially active in the issues we are presently
discussing. The Court did not progress the law on the subject of the
Political Question doctrine with this case, going beyond narrow boundaries
already drawn. It would not make sense to have international law condemn
aggression without the ICJ's ability to find that a country commits this
123. The political spiel of the members does not need to concern the deference
considerations as to the organization as a whole.
124. See Nicaragua, supra note 107.
125. This is true for democratic regimes. In totalitarian regimes, the goal is to stay in
power of something, and thus the state interest becomes the personal interest.
126. I am hopelessly exaggerating the U.S. position and I am aware of it, but it is necessary
to illustrate the point.
127. This answer changed slightly in the face on the Threat of nuclear weapons opinion in
1996, see Nuclear Weapons, supra note 112 (when the justices refused to answer a similar point
for lack of law on the subject).
128. The Charter forbids aggression. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 para. 4.
129. Again I am hopelessly simplifying, because the court had a huge amount of difficulty
defining the actual law, but to that later. The court determined there was law and that each act
could be held against it.
130. See Nicaragua, supra note 107.
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aggression. In order to hold a State to the promise not to commit
aggression, the question had to be within the Court's justiciability
standards.
Very closely intertwined with the concept of Political Question and
the transformation of questions is the issue of advisory opinions.
2. Transforming Non-Political Advisory Opinions
This subsection presents a related and yet different aspect of the issue
of transforming inquiries of political nature into legal ones. We have
determined that the Court has to engage in some rephrasing and limiting,
in order to be able to answer the questions at all. This subsection is
concerned not with the political implications of the questions, but with the
tendency of the ICJ to rephrase questions to suit the judges' answers, a
phenomenon limited to advisory opinions.
An advisory opinion is an opinion that judges are requested to render
on an abstract legal question. Usually, no factual background and no
actual controversy are involved. The concept is in place to help the other
branches of government to interpret existing law in an area, either in order
to tailor new laws and regulations to the existing ones, or to end an
interpretive dispute before it rises to the level of an actual controversy
before the courts. Some countries are familiar with the concept of
advisory opinions.'3 The ICJ often follows the practice of interpreting the
questions posed to it so drastically that the actual question is altered to an
extent the asking body did not intend. The next section will lay out the
practice in domestic courts and then draw parallels to the ICJ practice.
3. Domestic Advisory Opinions
Most courts do not recognize a doctrine of advisory opinion, yet some
countries and some states in the United States permit their Supreme Courts
to render advisory opinions.'32 To take an example of one of the United
States' states, the Rhode Island" Supreme Court shall render advisory
131. Some of these countries are India, and South Africa. Internationally, the ECJ
recognizes a similar doctrine.
132. It could be the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court depending on the system.
Some of the national courts include the Canadian Supreme Court, and the English and the Indian
Supreme Courts; See DRAHMA PRATAP, ADVISORY JURISDICTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT, 263 (1972) as well as the South African Constitutional Court, CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF S. AFR., Act 108 of 1996 S 167 (6). Islamic law incorporates the concept of
advisory opinions as well.
133. I am using the example of Rhode Island, because it is similar to many others in respect
of the statutory or constitutional underpinnings of the doctrine. For analysis of states allowing
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opinions upon written request by either of the coordinate branches but not
jointly.1'3 Where allowed, advisory opinions are limited in scope. States
vary in their limitations; the range extends from, "any question of law" to
"important questions of law" or "solemn occasions."'"' Courts differ in
their opinion as to the bindingness of advisory opinions.'" In general,
domestic judges tend to reject and disagree with the doctrine.'"7
State court judges have put additional limits on the issuance of
advisory opinions not found in the original grant of power to render the
opinion, such as prohibiting requests dealing with private interests.'" Even
in states where issuance of an advisory opinion is mandatory, the Supreme
Courts have imposed limits, such as the relatedness to the constitution.'39
Some more common general restrictions are the refusal to entertain an
advisory opinion if litigation is pending in a matter directly or indirectly
related to the advisory opinion.11
Judges often rephrase questions posed to them in order to either fit the
restrictions or fit their standards. An example of the common trait of
rephrasing the question is tellingly in a multilateral court: the ECJ
commonly rephrases questions submitted to it by the national courts to fit
the interpretive standard imposed on the Court.'4' National courts follow
the same practice if they feel that a question does not fit the requirement,
but nevertheless believe the query ought to be answered. 42
advisory opinions, and an analysis thereof, see Mel A. Topf, The Jurisprudence of the Advisory
Process in Rhode Island, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 207, 214 (1997).
134. Id. at 215.
135. Id. at 216.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 231, 232.
138. The Jurisprudence of the Advisory Process, at 234-35.
139. See e.g., Opinion to the Governor, 96 R.I. 358, 191 A.2d 611 (1963).
140. See Topf, supra note 133, at 236.
141. I am referring here specifically to the Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse,
1963, 1 C.M.L.R. 105 (1997) [hereinafter Van Gend], where the court rephrased the question in
this manner. The ECJ can take questions referred to it by national courts, if these questions only
deal with an abstract matter of law. The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on the
European Union, Nov. 10, 1997 OJ C 340 art. 234 (1997), makes these referrals of interpretive
questions possible and sometimes mandatory. They can be considered an advisory opinion as
well, because they do not decide a case as such, but help the courts in interpreting a provision
that is necessary to decide the case. In the area of treaties, the ECJ can give a purely advisory
opinion as well, but Van Gent, Id. does not arise out of such a pure advisory opinion.
142. See generally Topf, supra note 133.
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4. Practice of the ICJ
The ICJ also has certain requirements attached to its advisory
jurisdiction set out in Article 65 of the Statute of the Court. 43 The proper
organ has to request an opinion and the question must be a legal one.'"
There is no restriction such as "important," but "any" legal question
should be answered."' The judges believe they are vested with
discretion,14 but they have hardly declined any requests. This section
discusses the practice of the ICJ with regard to phrasing of the question by
the requesting organ. Advisory opinions pose a query to the Court that the
Court is supposed to answer.'"4  One aspect of this is the fitting of a
question into legal terms;'" the second aspect is interpreting the legal
question to mean one thing rather than the other.
A case thirty-two years after the Conditions of Admission case, 49
when the Political Question doctrine was well settled, illustrates'the
difference. Although the ICJ used to attempt to separate context and
query, it now required context. In the WHO v. Egypt case,' an advisory
opinion was requested, but instead of ignoring the actual circumstance to
answer an abstract question in a legal fashion, the Court stated: "if a
question put in the hypothetical way in which it is posed in the request is to
receive a pertinent and effectual reply, the Court must first ascertain the
meaning and full implications of the question in the light of the actual
framework of fact and law."'
143. ICJ Statute art. 65.
144. Id. at para. 1. See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.C.J. 66 (July 1996).
145. U.N. CHARTER art. 96 para. 1.
146. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 111, at para. 14.
147. Although the court considers itself to have discretion whether to answer an inquiry,
U.N. CHARTER, supra note 145, it has only refused to do so in two cases. There has been no
refusal, based on the discretionary power of the Court, to act upon a request for advisory opinion
in the history of the present Court; in the case concerning the Legality of the Use by a State of
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the refusal to give the World Health Organization the
advisory opinion requested by it was justified by the Court's lack of jurisdiction in that case. See
supra note 111, at para. 14.
148. The fitting of the question into legal terms is not limited to advisory cases, but I will
rely in this second on advisory opinions as a matter of example. This issue has been amply
addressed above.
149. See Conditions of Admission, supra note 35.
150. See Interpretation of an Agreement of 25 March 1951 between WHO and Egypt, 180
I.C.J. 73 (Dec. 20) [hereinafter WHO and Egypt].
151. Id. at 76.
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The Court still contended that the inquiry was a legal one, although
admitting that it had political implications.5 2 The ICJ declined to take
motives leading to the request into consideration. 1 3 It re-articulated a
question regardless of its already abstract character. The original inquiry
was this:
Are the negotiation and notice provisions of Section 37 of
the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the World
Health Organization and Egypt applicable in the event that
either party to the Agreement wishes to have the Regional
Office transferred from the territory of Egypt?
2. If so, what would be the legal responsibilities of both
the World Health Organization and Egypt, with regard to
the Regional Office in Alexandria, during the two-year
period between notice and termination of the Agreement?5
This inquiry would have required nothing but an interpretation of a
treaty between the World Health Organization (WHO) and Egypt.
Nevertheless, the World Court transformed the inquiry into: "What are
the legal principles and rules applicable to the question under what
conditions and in accordance with what modalities a transfer of the
Regional Office from Egypt may be effect? ' 5-
In changing the question, the Court effectively addressed the issue of
whether international organizations have to comply with their agreements;
therefore the ICJ ruled judicially actively. Measured against the working
definition, the ICJ clearly construed the request given in a fashion designed
to raise issues unnecessary to fully answer to the original request. Both the
almost sua sponte raising of an issue and the lack of limitation to the
necessary for a satisfying answer make the case a landmark decision.
In the Competence of the General Assembly case of 1950,' the Court
was faced with the question of whether the General Assembly could sua
sponte accept members without a positive or negative recommendation of
the Security Council.-7 The inquiry was directed at the issue of how to
interpret a vetoed resolution for acceptance or denial of acceptance-in
152. Id.
153. Id. at para. 33.
154. Id. at para. 1.
155. See WHO and Egypt, supra note 149, at para. 35.
156. Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of a state to the United
Nations, 150 I.C.J. 4 (Mar. 30) [hereinafter General Assembly].
157. Id. at 5
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short, whether a vetoed decision was a decision at all for the purposes of
acceptance.
The ICJ instead interpreted the question as follows: "The Court is,
therefore, called upon to determine solely whether the General Assembly
can make a decision to admit a State when the Security Council has
transmitted no recommendation to it." "'
The court here used "no recommendation" rather than what had been
described by General Assembly"5 9 as "negative recommendation."'  This
rephrase predetermined the outcome, because when "vetoed
recommendation" became "no recommendation" at all, only textualism
was needed.
This interpretation of the question here was not true'6' to the query;
nevertheless, it was not judicially active. Although the ICJ changed the
issue and avoided interpreting the true question of the General Assembly,
the judges gave the United Nations a sufficient answer, by refusing to
analyze whether a vetoed recommendation was sufficient, and rather
assuming that this was the case. Since this assumption fits within the
natural interpretation, the Court was not judicially active in this case.
In the Certain Expenses case, the Court decided whether cost incurred
during peacekeeping operations were expenses of the organization that had
to be paid by all its members. 162 The World Court again stressed that it
could only answer legal questions.' It concluded that all it was asked to
decide was the interpretation of the specific United Nations Charter
provision, namely Article 17.'" In the interpretation of this article
however, the Court extended the inquiry further. l'6 Claiming that nothing
but the query itself was relevant for a discussion under the advisory
opinion, the ICJ formally dismissed the French amendment to the inquiry
that had been rejected by the General Assembly.'" The ICJ still reserved
158. Id. at 7.
159. Id. at 9.
160. Id. at 7.
161. See General Assembly, supra note 156 at 21 (Judge Azevedo, dissenting, contends,
that the court left out an important part of the inquiry, namely the question whether a vetoed
recommendation would count as a negative recommendation).
162. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
163. Id. at 155.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 199 (Judge Fitzmaurice concurring, agrees that the court went into more detail
than required, see also Id. at 235, Judge Basedevant, dissenting).
166. Id. at 155.
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the right to comment on the particular amendment, namely the question of
the appropriateness of incurring the cost. 67
The judges of the 1962 Court in fact remained with the original
problem; however, in the decision, it inserted language justifying the
actions of the General Assembly by giving it the Court's seal of
appropriateness.' The ICJ could have stopped at page 162 of its opinion.
Everything after page 162 refers to the problem of appropriateness, which
the General Assembly specifically ruled out of the inquiry."6 The Court
specifically addressed that the General Assembly has an independent power
over international peace and security, and thereby declared the
peacekeeping operations legitimate.'70 The judges even went as far as to
make the inference explicit.'7' Judge Spiropoulos made clear that he
viewed the Court as exceeding the boundaries in his declaration following
the opinion.',
The Court in this case clearly overstepped the limits to judicial
activism, because of the result achieved and the fashion in which it was
achieved. As measured against our working definition, the Court clearly
lacked deference to the inquiry posed to it and took it upon itself to solve a
question that the General Assembly had explicitly taken out of the equation
for the ICJ to discuss. There was no ambiguity as to the General
Assembly's wishes.7 3
While the inquiry was evidently a legal one, the ICJ changed the
inquiry to add dictum. With this dictum the Court entered into sua sponte
considerations that are not within the scope of advisory opinions. The
World Court was faced with a question of interpretation technically not in
dispute; the task of an advisory opinion is to engage into an analysis that
answers the question narrowly so as to avoid possible conflict with a
standing practice. 74 Here, the Court engaged in an analysis the requesting
167. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34 at 156-57.
168. What I am referring to here is the language: "It is a consistent practice of the General
Assembly to include in the annual budget resolution, a provision for expenses relating to the
maintenance of peace and security." Id. at 160.
169. Id. after page 162 (the court turns to limitation on the budgetary power, which is
discussed in far more detail and in a direction not necessary for the immediate question at hand).
170. See General Assembly, supra note 156, at 163.
171. Id. at 176-77.
172. Judge Spiropoulos, supra note 160, at 180-81 (Judge Spender also agrees on this point,
concurring, at 182-83).
173. Since, as mentioned before, the General Assembly voted against the expansion of the
very question.
174. The same comments apply as mentioned before, regarding the possible difference
between practice and theory.
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organ wanted to avoid, causing a lack of deference, which alone renders
the opinion judicially active.7
The inquiry posed to the court in the Namibia Case' was rather
simple: "What are the legal consequences for States of the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council
resolution 276 (1970)?"'"
The broadness of the question allowed and forced the Court to go into
many details and into considerations beyond the immediately necessary.'
Surprisingly, the Court refused to take advantage of the full scope of the
inquiry. The actual outcome of the question is hardly as interesting as
some of the statements going along with the opinion. The Court could
have reviewed the legality of the resolutions made by the General
Assembly and the Security Council, as it had done previously in the
Certain Expenses," case with less authority to do so.", Instead the Court
states,
Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial
review or appeal in respect of the decisions taken by the
United Nations organs concerned. The question of the
validity or conformity with the Charter of General
Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) or of related Security
Council resolutions does not form the subject of the
request for advisory opinion.'"'
In the Namibia"' decision we find one of the rare instances in which
the Court under-uses the power conferred upon it. The question to be
answered here is whether this action amounts to judicial activism as
175. I feel the need to express that I do agree with the outcome of the case, and I am
relieved that the court decided as it did. Nevertheless, the task of this paper is to analyze the
jurisprudence of the court, and assess the attitude the court takes to its task. The evaluation of
their performance will be discussed later.
176. See Namibia, supra note 91
177. Id. at 27, para. 42.
178. The question whether this particular resolution of the Security Council was justified,
and what consequences would arise, are only examples.
179. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
180. Again, this touches on the issue of deference and the obligation to review to maintain
legitimacy in the UN.
181. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34, at para. 89. It would have been possible to
review the power to make this decision and the foundations of the decision of the other organs of
the UN, to assess whether South Africa's presence was indeed valid and the resolution without
effect. Although the court goes into some of these issues, not all are addressed. The selectivity
with which the court here operates is striking.
182. See Namibia, supra note 91.
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defined in this paper. From the decision that was handed down, the Court
stayed well within the boundaries of the inquiry, the Court also afforded
deference to the other organs of the United Nations and did not seem to
interpret in a lax fashion.
Nevertheless, not engaging in some kind of review concerning the
substance of the other organs' actions appears to be another form of
activism, namely decision based on personal preference., The refusal to
go into some of South Africa's concerns regarding voting patterns in the
Security Council might not have altered the query so to render the opinion
activist in the procedural sense, but changed the result. By refusing review
of other organs' actions, the Court was only concerned with the case, not
the overall scheme of the United Nations Charter. In the future, this action
might have consequences harmful to the United Nations system.
B. Interpretation of Substantive United Nations Charter Provisions
This paper will now turn to address decisions of the ICJ relating to the
substantive analysis of the United Nations Charter interpretation. In the
Conditions of Admission case,I" the Court was faced with the interpretation
of a narrow article of the United Nations Charter. The ICJ engaged in a
by-the-book textual analysis: what the meaning of the words were,
whether they were exclusive or by way of example. The court was here
guided by plain meaning of the text.", The court stated: "To warrant an
interpretation other than that which ensues from the natural meaning of the
words, a decisive reason would be required which has not been
established.""'6
The ICJ engaged in an analysis of the results of an opposite
decision in order to justify a result already reached and concluded that a
different decision would violate the spirit of Article Four of the United
Nations Charter. 18  Here, the Court was certainly not willing to
compromise the text of the United Nations Charter for political necessities
of the member States. It interpreted the United Nations Charter true to the
text and did not engage in loose interpretation. Thus, from a substantive
point of view, the Court did not rule in a judicially active fashion.
183. The court effectively decided that there could not be a review of UN organ action, a
striking view, which could well be further discussed in a different paper.
184. See Conditions to Admission, supra note 35, at 57.
185. Id. at 62.
186. Id. at 63.
187. Id.
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In the early phase of interpretation of the United Nations Charter and
a time when legal positivism was a preferred form of interpretation,' 8 the
Court would have been unlikely to decide otherwise. The Court had not
yet established enough strength to rule on the basis of purpose and intent
alone, not only because of its own weakness and inexperience, but also
because of the credibility of the organization and its purpose. The
organization had been formed to create a body that supervised the rule of
international law in the form of peace and security; how could its principal
organ rule on any other basis than the written rule of law? The text of
Article Four is quite clear, so that it would have asked too much of the
Court to decide otherwise. The conclusion here must therefore be that the
court did not rule judicially actively.
In the Competence of the General Assembly case89, the Court
proceeded in the same pattern, not only because the query was made only
two years later, but also because the same Article Four was involved and
the surrounding reasons had not dramatically changed.
In the Effects of Awards of the UNAT case in 1954'1, the Court was
faced with a request for advisory opinion that was in part too far remote
from an actual provision of the United Nations Charter for the World
Court to operate on a purely textual basis. The opinion can be separated
into two parts. The Court held that the findings of the UNAT were
binding upon the organization and that the General Assembly had the right
to establish the UNAT."' In the first part of the decision, the ICJ analyzed
the language of the statue of the tribunal and found it to be a judicial
body."2 Then the Court proceeded to infer all characteristics of a judicial
body, so the tribunal could fulfill its purpose.191
When the court proceeded to consider whether the General Assembly
,had the power to create a tribunal rendering decisions binding on the
Organization, the analysis was further removed from any text. Article 101
provided the basis from which to infer the power of the General Assembly
188. See R. MOLES, DEFINITION AND RULE IN LEGAL THEORY: A REASSESSMENT OF
H.L.A. HART AND THE POSITIVIST TRADITION (1987); See also EDWARD MCWHINNEY, JUDGE
MANFRED LACHS AND JUDICIAL LAW MAKING, 17 (1995); See also MCWHINNEY, supra note
35, at 35 (commenting on the positivist tradition).
189. See General Assembly, supra note 156.
190. See Effects of Awards, supra note 47.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 53. The court found that a judiciaLorgan was established and that the nature of a
judicial organ includes binding decisions and independence. It therefore refused to let the
General Assembly have the right to review without alternation of the statute.
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to create the tribunal,1'9 however, the article is hardly detailed. The Court
had to infer intent and purpose to even be able to rule on the question
whether the General Assembly had the power to create the UNAT.1 95
Without a strong background of a rather clear United Nations Charter
provision, the ICJ was left with intent and purpose of the provisions and,
frankly speaking, common sense. Although this decision was only four
years after the Competence of the General Assembly case,19' it seems the
Court was more comfortable with departing from the actual text. There
appear to be several reasons for this departure: first, there was hardly any
applicable text; second, it made logical sense; third, principles common to
many legal systems in the world suggested this result; fourth, the departure
only briefly touched upon the subject of the inquiry; and fifth, the ICJ
cannot refuse a proper request for an advisory opinion.
The court did not overstep the bounds to activism in the result. The
argument that articles 101(1) and 101(3) were a basis to infer that the
General Assembly had authority to even create the tribunal is hardly
convincing. The Court attempted to conceal the lack of text (and thus of
law) by pointing to remotely applicable portions of the United Nations
Charter. The judges did not directly admit to the United States
constitutional language, that the creation of the UNAT was a "necessary
and proper" use of powers, to fulfill the task given to the General
Assembly, but did not fall very short of the statement. Measured against
the working definition, I cannot find activism regardless of the apparent
lack of text. The Court showed deference to the General Assembly, by
conceding that there was a need and the possibility to create the tribunal.
The standard of deference applied seems most appropriate in this
instance, first because the General Assembly agreed and second it seemed
logical to proceed in this fashion. There was no danger threatening basic
principles of the United Nations, because the creation of the UNAT did not
violate any express term of the United Nations Charter and rather fostered
the principles therein. Holding the General Assembly to the statute of the
tribunal, as they had created it, was based on textualism. In interpreting
the statute of the tribunal narrowly based on text and function, the ICJ did
194. U.N. CHARTER art. 100.
195. The language of the text of the Charter in the relevant provisions is as follows: "the
Security Council under regulations established by the General Assembly shall appoint the staff."
U.N. CHARTER art. 101, para. 1. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 101, para. 3 ("the paramount
consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service
shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency.")
196. See General Assembly, supra note 156.
197. U.N. CHARTER art. 100, paras. 1, 3.
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neither interpret the statute in a loose fashion, so as to bring them into the
definition of activism nor progressed international law. The decision was
very narrow in scope and did not affect international law in general, so as
to progress it.
Another example of this approach is the Certain Expenses case.-w
Although this case has been discussed in an earlier section under the
heading of procedural activism, the value of this case for the section on
substance will become evident. The Court employed analysis of the text of
the United Nations Charter, discussing the issue whether an expense had to
be administrative or other, to introduce the issue of maintenance of peace
and security into the discussion. '' In deciding the case, the ICJ introduced
the distinction between enforcement and non-enforcement action." Since
the United Nations Charter seems to give the General Assembly and the
Security Council concurrent jurisdiction over the matter of international
peace and security, 02 the World Court had to find a way to make sense of
the United Nations Charter and transform it into a workable form. By
making the distinction, the ICJ introduced a new concept into the United
Nations Charter.22 The dividing line between the Security Council's
competence and the General Assembly's competence is ICJ made. The use
of purpose and intent as interpretive guidelines becomes more evident in
this case, compared to the cases of the earlier decisions.
Through its procedural activism, the Court increased the difficulty for
itself and ruled in a judicially active fashion. The Court did not allow
deference to the creators of the United Nations Charter, trusting that
concurrent jurisdiction was feasible without a line drawn, so as to give
room for practice. The ICJ progressed the law of the United Nations
Charter by introducing a new concept creating the modern peacekeeping
missions, which were not originally in the United Nations Charter. For
these reasons, the Court was judicially active in the substance of this case.
Recalling the deadlock in the Security Council, the ICJ was, more likely
then not, concerned with the possibility of the United Nations being able to
fulfill its purpose and thus generated this result. However, it should not
have gotten politically involved. The Court was not forced to decide on an
198. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
199. Id. at 160.
200. Id. at 163.
201. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para.1; art. 11, para. 1.
202. See Certain Expenses supra note 34, at 197 (Judge Spender, in a separate opinion,
expresses his discontent with the approach of the majority, and warns the court not to engage into
political considerations rather than legal ones).
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infringement of powers, and no substantive violation of principles of the
United Nations Charter was evident as to invite review.
In the Reparation for Injuries case,2°1 the ICJ conferred upon the
organization international legal personality. Loosely tying this privilege to
the text of Article 100 of the United Nations Charter,204 the ICJ implied that
an opposite decision would violate the text of this Article, nevertheless
plainly stating:
The Charter does not expressly confer upon the
Organization the capacity to include, in its claim for
reparation, damage caused to the victim or to persons
entitled through him. The Court must therefore begin by
enquiring whether the provisions of the Charter concerning
the functions of the Organization, and the part played by
its agents in the performance of those functions. 0
The Court here had no choice but to use a positivist approach,
because of the simple lack of text. Does this make the decision activist by
definition? Not by itself. The Court here exhibited great deference to the
makers of the United Nations Charter as well as to the personnel involved.
What was implied did in fact progress the law, but not to an extent that
was surprising or unforeseeable.20 The judges pointed to the uniqueness of
the United Nations Charter and of its function, thereby limiting the
possible extent of the decision. Nothing in the United Nations Charter
made its legal personality express; giving the organization international
personality was a novelty in international law.20 Our prior discussion
concerning the character of the United Nations Charter is of help here to
evaluate the ICJ decision.
As adequate for a "consensual constitution," the judges were under
the obligation to bridge gaps in international law. This case marks a
paramount measure for the difference between creating law and bridging
the gaps. The former is improper, while the latter is proper. Whether this
decision is activist or not, this case illustrates the closest possible scenario
between proper bridging and improper creation. 8 Giving the United
203. See Reparations, supra note 65.
204. U.N. CHARTER, art. 100.
205. See Reparations, supra note 65, at 182.
206. Id. at 190 (Judge Alvarez, concurring in the result, is even of the opinion that the court
has the legitimate power to progress the law in the face of new situations).
207. Up to this point only states had had international legal personality.
208. I must be clear that I refuse to express my opinion, whether this case is activist or not,
in an absolute fashion. It is a close call and reasonable people can differ.
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Nations legal personality was necessary for the functioning of the
organization. But does the end justify the means? Although the judges
attempted to limit their ruling by stating that the United Nations has special
status, politicians are unlikely to have considered the theoretical
implications of what they intended to create. If they had known that it
would take actual legal personality, and what leap this would entail for
international law, to create the United Nations, they might have denied this
status to their creation. No international institution had had legal
personality before, so that the leap the ICJ took crosses the line to
activism.
In the Namibia case, °10 the Court again interpreted the United Nations
Charter in a purpositivist fashion. Over South Africa's objection, the ICJ
condoned the voting procedures of in the Security Council, although they
violated the actual text of the United Nations Charter . 2 t The Court did not
want to allow South Africa to invoke an issue it felt that only the
permanent members of the Security Council had standing to raise. By
refusing to let South Africa raise the issue, the Court again overstepped its
limits. The considerations that probably went into the decision were more
focused on a just result, namely that South Africa leave Namibia, than law.
This result orientation fits neatly in the definition of judicial activism. A
consideration outside the law was to regain the trust of Third World
Countries, after the devastating South West Africa decision series. 212
The court ruled in an activist fashion by construing the text of the
United Nations Charter so loosely and letting practice alter the United
Nations Charter's express terms. The ICJ could have declined to decide
the issue raised by South Africa based on standing or through interpretation
of the question, rather than to decide the issue.
In the Threat of Nuclear Weapons case, 213 The ICJ decided the
question posed, but refused to decide an issue imbedded in it, namely the
question whether self-defense would trump the prohibition against use of
209. See Reparations, supra note 65, at 197-98 (Judge Hackworth dissenting, agrees, that
there was nothing suggesting this kind of power for an international organization). Cf. id. at 205
(Judge Pasha, dissenting).
210. See Namibia, supra note 91.
211. Id. In this case, the ICJ decided that an abstention was equally valid as a vote form a
permanent member of the Security Council. The text of the Charter however requires an
affirmative vote: "Decisions of the security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members."
U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para 3.
212. The court had been immediately criticized for its decisions and, in the aftermath, the
court changed its views. See MCWHINNEY, supra note 188, at 14.
213. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
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force.' The ICJ alleged the reason of insufficiency of the law in order to
avoid deciding the issue.2 '
The World Court did not overreach beyond normal judicial limits in
this case. By admitting to a lacuna the Court did not stretch the limits of
the question in abuse of discretion, nor did it display a lack of deference.
This was the first time in the history of the Court that the judges decided to
take a query, but returned a decision that did not give a full answer,
because of a lacuna. In the overall structure, it could not harm the United
Nations to admit to certain gaps in the law. No one organ needed
deference in this regard because they were likely not to be involved in such
issues. The question had been: "Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in
any circumstance permitted under international law? 216 The Court did its
best not to alter the question and refrained from trying to legislate.
After the aforementioned examples of ICJ jurisprudence that
established some cases of judicial activism, this paper will consider
whether the Court legitimately exercises this activism, thereby excusing the
activism exhibited.
C. Legitimacy of the ICI
The ICJ is the principal judicial body of the United Nations.2" As the
principal judicial organ, its task is to interpret the United Nations Charter
and to resolve disputes between the organs of the United Nations and its
member States. The ICJ has on several occasions exceeded the task given
to it by the United Nations Charter, by ignoring a question, by adding to
it, or by interpreting the United Nations Charter loosely. Where does the
ICJ obtain its legitimacy, if it is judicially active?
Like many federal judges, ICJ judges are not elected by common
ballot among the people in their community. They are nominated by the
Permanent Court of Arbitration and then elected by the General Assembly
and the Security Council. 218 The judges represent the major legal systems
and cultures of the world.2"9 This representation is not formal and the
214. See Antonio F. Perez, The Passive Virtues and the World Court: Pro-dialogic
Abstention by the International Court of Justice, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 399, 430 (1997).
215. Id.
216. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 112.
217. U.N. CHARTER, art. 92.
218. ICJ Statute art. 4, para. 1.
219. E.g., no two judges of the same nationality are allowed on the court. ICJ Statue art. 3,
para. 1. See also Liz Heffernan, The Nuclear Weapons Opinions Reflections on the Advisory
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 28 STETSON L. REV. 133, 135-36 (1998).
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judges do not serve as agents of their countries, but are neutral.' Since
they are not representatives, do they have the legitimacy to make law? In
international law, countries make law by either treaty or custom."' If the
judges do not represent the will of the countries, they cannot make law
with democratic legitimacy.m There has been some writing on democratic
legitimacy on the international law community, without a conclusive result.
International law is not based on democratic legitimacy and does not need
to be. International law is a separate legal system, as explained many
times in this paper, and therefore, the rules of what constitutes legitimacy
are different from the domestic context and legitimacy must be derived
from a different source. The basic legitimacy of the ICJ derives from the
instrument creating it, but if the scope of the power conferred is exceeded
by judicial activism, there is little that can offer legitimacy. Of course it is
difficult for any judge to proclaim the law without coloring the words and
adding to the flavor, but this coloring may not exceed the scope of bridging
gaps in the law. m
If judges in the World Court continue to actively make law, m their
legitimacy will be lost. Judicial activism in the ICJ can take not only the
form of active creation of law, but also of (passive) refusal to act in
fulfillment of their judicial function in accordance with the United Nations
Charter. When the World Court refuses, for example, to pass judgment on
or review certain actions of other United Nations organs, it cannot fulfill
its functions fully, namely to protect the object and purpose of the United
Nations Charter.m If judges do not fulfill their functions, they loose
legitimacy and put the credibility of the United Nations and the ICJ at
risk.6
220. ICJ Statue art. 2.
221. See Certain Expenses, supra note 34.
222. I will not go into detail as to the democratic legitimacy of international law in general,
first because it will exceed this paper's scope, and second because it has been hotly debated
among scholars.
223. Talim Elias argues that the General Assembly took cognizance of the rule making
powers of the ICJ, and that this action, taken in resolution 3232 (XXIX) of 12 November 1974,
is sufficient. He also argues that the court cannot declare a non liquet. See TALIM ELIAS,
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SOME CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, 216-17 (1983). I
cannot agree fully with this argument for several reasons. First, the General Assembly cannot by
resolution itself make hard law, so it cannot authorize the ICJ to do so. Second, the resolution
itself is not as unambiguous as portrayed.
224. They may not since the Nuclear Weapons case showed the newly coming reluctance
and preference to admit to a lacuna.
225. Q. David, supra note 91.
226. It is, in my view, hypocritical to let the 880-pound Gorilla do whatever it pleases.
There is a limit. Articles I and 2 of the Charter and the ICJ should be there to watch over this
Pair 217
218 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 8:181
I do not mean to imply that Article 3922 determinations are
reviewable, but rather only measures blatantly against the text of the
United Nations Charter. Since the World Court has, on numerous
occasions, refused to review the other organs' actions for their
compatibility with principles of the United Nations,m this paper has not
even reached the question on how much review should be in place. First,
there must be review in the first place.29 The ICJ has virtually rejected the
Political Question doctrine and has no excuse to reject a review of other
organ's actions. In the Namibia case the judges refused review, in the
Certain Expenses case they undertook review. There are more examples
on both sides; some review engaged in for right or wrong reason and in the
proper or improper way, some review refused for the right or wrong
reasons, in a proper or improper way. Lack of consistency in deciding
will not help to establish legitimacy and credibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
Procedurally, the Court used to be more active than it is now.
Concerning substantive activism, the actions of the Court can be tied to the
existence of text to guide the interpretation. 23° When there is clear text, the
Court usually does not ignore the plain meaning. When no clear text is
involved, the Court has proven to be quite active in creating law.
In the early stages of the ICJ, the justices were trained mostly in
Europe or were themselves European."' This resulted in a strong tendency
toward legal positivism. The judges wanted to separate particular issues
totally from their social context. 2 2 Unfortunately over time, the judges
were not able to separate the issues form their social context and fell victim
to the apparent need to create law. When clear text is involved, the judges
limit. Although Marcella David, supra note 91, has pointed out difficulties, I am referring not to
things that cannot be checked against object and purpose like the determination of a threat to the
peace but rather only to the actions taken and if they violate international peace and security
blatantly.
227. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
228. Compare Namibia, supra note 91.
229. 1 think I have made clear how much review I would apply in through the standard of
deference I have suggested as measure for judicial activism.
230. Cf BODIE, supra note 92. Bodie subdivides the courts activism in two phases, before
and after 1966. I disagree, due to the reasons shown in this paper. Concerning the substance
before 1966, the ICJ stripped the inquiry to its textual essentials. id. at 64. In the period after
1966, the ICJ turned to more evaluative reasons and became more conscious of the charter's
background, purpose, and intention. Id. at 62.
231. Id. at 61.
232. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES xvii,
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used to rule for the plain meaning, and when no clear text was available,
purpose and intent of the United Nations Charter ruled the decision. In
later cases, with a new set of judges, the World Court took great liberty
with which issues were decided and which chosen to be left at rest, once
any inquiry or conflict had been presented to them. This liberty falls
within the working definition of judicial activism. Although not every case
warrants this label, the analysis above shows that the Court in procedural
liberty throughout the years of jurisprudence displays a great deal of
activism that is not part of a grand scheme.
Another factor in this assessment, however, has to be the need for
activism. It has been said that every judicial body makes law and that
indeed, lawmaking is an essential function of the adjudicative role., 3 The
role of the judges is to state the law, and in doing so, judges necessarily
add color or flavor to the rule, thereby adding and making new law.2 34
Judges necessarily advance the law minimally by their interpretation and
their application. It is also clear that the position of the ICJ as only arbiter
increases pressure on the judges to reach the right result, while they are
still trapped with a strong need for restraint because their decisions cannot
be remedied like domestic decisions. Nevertheless, the ICJ often went
beyond the "flavoring" of the law by deciding issues not in question or
avoiding them. The unique role of the Court, as it has been described
supra, makes its decisions uniquely important and restraint on its side is
desirable. Although the judges found the right measure at times, the lack
of consistency, traceable to different panels at different times with different
morals and cultural backgrounds, shows that judicial activism in the ICJ is
less a creed and more a creature of personal preference.
Although the intent of the judges to progress the law and heal the
international machinery is commendable, where it occurred, medicine
applied the wrong way can still harm the patient. Consistency is necessary
for the ICJ. Doctrines of ripeness and mootness have their place in
international and domestic law, so that the decision of questions not within
the inquiry should, more often than not, not be an issue. Similar to the
ripeness doctrine, an issue not on the agenda should not be decided in a
sterile setting, removed from a problem situation. It could result, and at
times has resulted, in a fundamental decision with the ability to cause more
233. Speech by Laurance Boisson de Chazournes, at 95th Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law, panel on the Role of the International adjudicator, available at
http://www.asil.org/opps.htm (last visited Apr. 2001).
234. See Reparations, supra note 65, at 190 (Judge Alvarez, concurring in the result, states
that he cannot even see the line that separates law making from development of law).
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harm than use. The World Court has said in the Asylum case"5 it ought to
consider the question asked and ignore those not asked. This is also
known as the non-ultra petita rule. "6 The judges should stick to this rule.
If the ICJ were less active procedurally, it would be less hard-pressed in
some substantive decisions.
The ICJ has a unique task in the international plane, which calls for
consideration of the judges' positions as to the basics of the structure of the
United Nations, the position of the Court in the organization, and their
own roles. Once these factors are clearer in the minds of the judges, the
activism exhibited by ICJ may be directed into a more controlled and
consistent manner that does justice to the important role played in
international law. If consistency is reached beyond one set of judges or
one set of circumstances, the ICJ will receive more leeway for being
judicially active. Unfortunately, over the fifty-year period the Court has
been in place, the personal attitudes of the judges varied so strongly that no
coherent trend can be identified, and the Court at times resembles an ad
hoc panel rather than a standing Court with fifty years of decisions to guide
it.
Judicial activism is certainly not "evil" for international law,
nevertheless, everything can be overdone. The judges in the World Court
can be compared with Supreme Court justices in the United States. To a
degree judicial activism is inherent in their function as the court of last
resort. The judges have to be active. In international law, the ideal would
be comparable to domestic law: legislators come together and create law
where there is a need for it. Unfortunately, international law is always
behind its time. 1  If we do not want more non-decisions of the ICJ as in
the Threat of Nuclear Weapons case,231 then we have to live with an active
Court from time to time.
The United Nations Charter must be interpreted first on its face, and
the result so achieved must be weighed against the object and purpose of
the United Nations Charter. The object and purpose must then be
construed broadly to exclude only those results, which would offend its
purpose blatantly in order to afford sufficient deference to the other organs
of the United Nations. Nevertheless, consistency in this review is
necessary to afford legitimacy to both the court and to the United Nations.
235. See Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 150 I.C.J. 266, 402 (Nov. 20). Although this was a
contentious case, the rephrasing of questions remains, and the doctrine administered by the court
should also stay consistent.
236. See BODIE, supra note 92, at 65.
237. Compare MCWHINNEY & MARTIN, supra note 35, at 147-48.
238. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 112.
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If that takes some activism from time to time, the author is willing to
accept that. But not everyone shares this view, as some say: "[A]
proactive court is as dangerous as a proactive council."219 One cannot help
but feel a swell of pity for the ICJ judges, stuck with the need for
deference and review-stuck with a whipsaw.
239. See David, supra note 91, at 149.
Pair 221
